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NOTES
The Emerging Law of Sexual Harassment: Relief
Available to the Public Employee
Sexual harassment' in the workplace is a widespread problem with
no clear legal definition.2 Usually committed by an employer or co-
worker,8 the types of activity which constitute harassment range from a
single encounter to continuous sexual tormenting.4 At the least, the vic-
tim is subjected to an unfavorable work environment; at the most, the
victim can lose her job for refusing to acquiesce to sexual demands.
Clearly, no individual should be forced to suffer such consequences as a
precondition of employment.
A victim of sexual harassment has several avenues of relief available,
depending upon the circumstances of the harassment and harm suffered
by the plaintiff. Title VII 5 recognized sexual harassment as illegal sex
discrimination in the mid-1970s. 6 State tort law has traditionally pro-
1 Sexual harassment refers to "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context
of a relationship of unequal power." C. MACKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1
(1979). In the employment context, the employer exerts influence over the employee due to his
superior position. The employee is forced to tolerate sexual advances due to her fear ofjob loss. Id.
at 2. Although females might be guilty of sexual harassment, this note is limited to the more preva-
lent scenario where females are the victims of the harassment.
2 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines define sexual harass-
ment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an in-
timidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1604-1611(a) (1985). Although not bound by EEOC guidelines, courts afford them
great deference. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 n.7 (11 th Cir. 1982).
3 The employer can also be liable for the harassing activities of nonemployees, usually custom-
ers patronizing the place of business. Although these cases are less common, the EEOC expressly
provides for liability "when the employer (or its agents and supervisory employees) knows or should
have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604(e) (1985). See Note, The Dehumanizing Puzzle of Sexual Harassment: A Survey of the Law Concerning
Harassment of Women in the Workplace, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 574, 592-93 (1985).
4 Activity that amounts to sexual harassment can vary from verbal innuendos and abuses, to
physical patting and touching, to outright demands for sexual relations. See C. MACKINNON, supra
note 1, at 2.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982). Title VII provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
6 Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), remanded sub noam., Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387
(D.D.C. 1980). At the outset, only quidpro quo harassment claims were recognized. In this scenario,
the employer conditions receipt ofjob benefits on the plaintiff's acquiescence to sexual advances.
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vided recovery for harassment victims. 7 Finally, sexual harassment is dis-
crimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment,8 and actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (section
1983). 9 The public employee, 10 then, has an additional claim on consti-
tutional grounds.
The unique factual scenarios of most sexual harassment claims make
these cases difficult to adjudicate under any one existing theory. This
note will analyze each of the claims available to the public employee, in-
cluding the elements of each cause of action, possible remedies, and the
current state of the law. Part I explains the problematic nature of a sex-
ual harassment claim. Part II considers claims under Title VII. Part III
analyzes state tort law relief. Part IV discusses the equal protection cause
of action. Finally, Part V concludes that each of these remedies is inade-
quate and that clear state policy prohibiting sexual harassment in the
workplace is necessary.
I. The Problem of Obtaining Relief for Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment suits are problematic because male-female rela-
tionships are wrought with uncertainties. Courts face the burden of de-
ciding when an overture is welcome and when it is harassment. The
courts are ill-equipped to meet this challenge. In the simplest case, the
employer approaches the employee with a demand that the employee en-
gage in sexual relations with the employer, or lose herjob. This demand
is obviously sexual harassment and is illegal. However, rarely are the
lines so clearly drawn.
See infra note 27 and accompanying text. Courts now recognize claims of hostile work environment,
wherein the plaintiff is subjected to sexual harassment with no economic effect on her employment,
such as job loss or denial of employment benefits. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399
(1986). See also infra note 33.
7 See infra notes 48-73 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 3, at 595-603.
8 The fourteenth amendment, in relevant part, provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9 The relevant portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities served by the Constitution and laws shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id. The federal cause of action for damages against state and local officials for constitutional depri-
vations "was designed to protect individuals against a misuse of power made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 829
(2d Cir. 1977). The sexual harassment plaintiff, then, pleads a violation of federal constitutional
rights, and asks for damages pursuant to § 1983. See, e.g., Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d
1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
10 For purposes of this note, a person is a "public employee" if her employer acts under color of
state law for purposes of § 1983. See supra note 9. Examples include employees of state agencies,
public schools and municipalities.
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The employer might actually believe his advances are welcome, ne-
gating the intent sometimes necessary for tort recovery.11 If the em-
ployee acquiesces initially and becomes sexually involved with the
employer, courts might find that the plaintiff voluntarily participated, and
thus cannot recover for sexual harassment. The facts of Vinson v. Taylor 1
2
illustrate the case where an employee initially acquiesed to her em-
ployer's advances.
In Vinson, the plaintiff began work as a teller at the bank where the
defendant was a manager. The plaintiff's relationship with the defendant
started when he asked her to dinner, and during the meal suggested that
they engage in sexual relations. Although she refused at first, the plain-
tiff later acquiesced. Their sexual relationship lasted over the next sev-
eral years, during which time the defendant became increasingly
aggressive and the plaintiff was forced into many sexual encounters
against her will. The plaintiff also described episodes during this period
when the defendant harassed her by fondling her breasts and buttocks in
front of other employees. The bank eventually discharged the plaintiff
for excessive use of leave.'
3
Clearly such behavior is sexual harassment on its face. 14 However,
because the court found that the plaintiff voluntarily engaged in a sexual
relationship with the defendant, the court found no illegal sexual harass-
ment. 15 The court refused to acknowledge the plaintiff's motive for en-
tering the relationship: Although she was not physically forced into the
relationship, she did not invite her employer's advances. She partici-
pated in the relationship because of her fear of her employer and his
position of power over her. 16 This basic problem of ascertaining what
behavior is consensual male-female interaction and what is harassment
can lead to inadequate recovery for the victim.
II. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196417 makes sex discrimination
in employment illegal. It was not until 1976 that a federal court recog-
nized sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination under Title
VII.18 The Supreme Court acknowledged a cause of action under Title
VII for sexual harassment for the first time in 1986 in Meritor Savings Bank
11 See Andrews, The Legal and Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment, 14 N.C. CEcr. LJ. 113,
155 (1983).
12 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,708 (D.D.C. 1980). Capital City Federal Savings and Loan
Association, a codefendant, subsequently became Meritor Savings Bank. Meritor was the petitioner
in the appeal to the Supreme Court. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
13 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,708, at 14,687-88.
14 See supra note 1.
15 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,708, at 14,692-93.
16 At trial, the plaintiff testified that she agreed to have sexual relations with her employer only
because she feared he would dismiss her from her job if she failed to do so. Id. at 14,688. Ulti-
mately, in Mentor, the Supreme Court held that the correct inquiry is whether the "respondent by
her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual
participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary." 106 S. Ct. at 2406.
17 See supra note 5.
18 Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
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v. Vinson.19 Until that time, lower courts defined the parameters of the
Title VII action.
20
The plaintiff must consider certain characteristics of a Title VII
cause of action before determining whether this claim would provide re-
lief. Initially, Title VII prohibits discrimination by an employer.2' An em-
ployer is strictly liable for the acts of supervisory personnel when the
supervisor uses his power to extort sexual favors from his employee by
threatening herjob (either explicitly or implicitly) if she does not comply.
However, the employer will not be liable for the acts of plaintiff's super-
visor or coworkers in creating a harassing atmosphere unless the plaintiff
shows the employer had knowledge (actual or constructive) of the dis-
crimination, and that the employer failed to take appropriate remedial
action.22 The discrimination must affect a term or condition of employ-
ment to be actionable under Title VII.23
Remedies under Title VII are extremely limited. The plaintiff may
be reinstated to her job, and receive back pay and attorney's fees.24
Some courts award nominal damages in circumstances where no other
relief is available under the Title, presumably to provide the plaintiff with
a means of paying attorney's fees. 25 However, most courts have held that
damages are not available under Title VII.26 Title VII does not explicitly
provide for compensatory or punitive damages.
A. Quid Pro Quo
The elements of a Title VII cause of action vary according to the
type of discrimination suffered. A Title VII plaintiff can bring what is
called a quid pro quo claim. In such a case, an "explicit exchange" takes
place: "[T]he woman must comply sexually or forfeit an employment
19 106 S. Ct. 2399.
20 See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d
934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) (emphasis added).
22 In Henson, the plaintiffwas a dispatcher for the police department. She alleged that the chief
of police subjected her to sexual harassment. The plaintiff testified at trial that she had complained
to the town manager of the police chief's activity. The manager did nothing to restrain the police
chief and even suggested that a liason would be mutually beneficial. 682 F.2d at 905 n.10. Based on
this evidence, the court found that the city had knowledge of the harassment.
The court also discussed the difference between the standards of employer liability for (1) acts
of supervisors in denying job benefits and (2) coworkers in creating an unpleasant work environ-
ment. In the former case, when the supervisor acts, he "is acting within at least the apparent scope
of the authority entrusted to him by the employer." Id. at 910. Thus, strict liability applies. How-
ever, a coworker can create a harassing work environment while completely outside his authority.
For this reason, the court noted that a coworker's conduct cannot be imputed to the employer with-
out the employer's knowledge (actual or constructive) of the behavior. Id.
23 See supra note 5.
24 The statute provides in relevant part:
[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment prac-
tice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.., or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
25 See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 253 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
26 Andrew v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 728 F.2d 989, 992 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984); Bundy v.Jackson, 641
F.2d 934, 946 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1981); DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 808 (1st Cir. 1980).
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benefit." 27 The plaintiff thus suffers a detriment to her job status as a
result of the discrimination-either by losing her job or being denied a
promotion or benefit.28 In the common scenario, the plaintiff is fired
after refusing the employer's sexual advances. 29 The employer is nor-
mally the perpetrator of the discrimination in a quid pro quo claim, be-
cause he is the only party with the power to affect the plaintiff's
employment.
30
Quid pro quo claims are. analyzed pursuant to traditional Tite VII
principles outlined by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.31 The analysis emphasizes the motive of the employer; in order to
prevail on the merits, the plaintiff must prove that the employer inten-
tionally discriminated against her.
3 2
B. Hostile Work Environment
A hostile work environment claim is also available under Title VII.
Courts fashioned this claim after recognizing that not every discrimina-
tion case encompasses the denial of a specific employment benefit.33 In
these cases, the plaintiff is subjected to sexual advances and suggestions
sufficient to create an unpleasant work environment.3 4 Either coworkers,
supervisors or employers create the harassing environment.
3 5
The crux of the plaintiff's claim is that she is subjected to this envi-
ronment merely because of her sex. The discrimination, thus, adversely
affects women as a class.3 6 The McDonnell Douglas test, when applied to
quid pro quo harassment cases, focuses on the denial of specific employ-
ment benefits because of the employee's sex.37 The test is modified to
27 C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 32.
28 See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (plaintiff discharged for refusing to
cooperate in sexual liason with her employer).
29 Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976).
30 See Note, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 83, 86 (1984).
31 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff must prove the following elements to establish a prima
fade Title VII case:
(1) that he [the plaintiff] is a member of a ["protected class"];
(2) that he applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants;
(3) that, despite his qualifications he was rejected; and,
(4) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
32 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See also Note, Sexual
Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HAuv. L. Rv. 1449, 1455 (1984).
33 The first case to recognize a hostile work environment claim was Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d
934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Several supervisors regularly propositioned the plaintiff, requesting that she
go to motels and on vacations with them. In emphasizing the importance of recognizing this claim
under Title VII, the court held that without this cause of action "an employer could sexually harass a
female employee with impunity by carefully stopping short of firing the employee or taking any other
tangible actions against her in response to her resistance ...." Id. at 945.
34 By creating an unpleasant work environment, the employer alters a condition of employ-
ment-"the psychological and emotional work environment." Id. at 944.
35 See Note, supra note 30, at 86.
36 The claim thus differs from the quid pro quo claim, in which the plaintiff alleges discrimination
affecting her as an individual. See Note, supra note 32, at 1456.
37 See id. See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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address hostile environment claims.3 8 The focus becomes the em-
ployee's subjection to an intolerable work environment which she is
forced to endure solely because of her sex. The plaintiff bears the initial
burden of proving discrimination against a protected class. The defend-
ant may rebut this evidence with evidence of a nondiscriminatory pur-
pose. Finally, even if the defendant meets his burden, the plaintiff can
prevail with proof of nondiscriminatory alternatives.3 9
A crucial issue in any hostile work environment action is the stan-
dard of liability of the employer for the acts of his employees. 40 In Mer-
itor Savings Bank v. Vinson,4 1 the Court held that an employer is not strictly
liable for the acts of his employees. 42 After setting this limit, the Court
failed to enunciate other guidelines for determining employers' liability.
Instead, the Court determined that lower courts should "look to agency
principles for guidance in the area."' 43 The courts have not reached a
consensus as to when an employer may be held liable for the acts of his
employees in a hostile work environment claim.44
Title VII does not provide adequate relief for the victim of sexual
harassment. The fortunate plaintiff will be awarded reinstatement, back
pay and attorney's fees.45 Rarely will a return to the workplace provide
relief for the person who has suffered serious and ongoing sexual harass-
ment in that atmosphere.46 If the plaintiff has been discharged for cause,
regardless of whether she endured harassment in the workplace, she can-
not recover damages pursuant to Title VII. The reality of inadequate
Title VII recovery illustrates that the objective of Title VII-to eliminate
38 The elements of a hostile work environment claim are:
(1) The employee belongs to a protected group.
(2) The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment.
(3) The harassment complained of was based upon sex.
(4) The harassment complained of affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of
employment.
(5) respondeat superior.
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982).
39 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1159-60 (1976).
40 Under Title VII, only an employer is liable for discrimination. See supra note 5. Thus, the
plaintiff in a hostile work environment claim must allege respondeat superior in order to hold the
employer liable for the actions of the employees who created the hostile environment. See supra note
38.
41 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
42 106 S. Ct. at 2408.
43 Id.
44 Since Meritor, two courts that have addressed the issue of employer liability have adopted the
rule that the employer is liable if he knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
prompt remedial action. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986); Volk
v. Coler, 638 F. Supp. 1555, 1557-58 (C.D. Ill. 1986).
It is unclear from the Volk opinion whether the court intended for this standard to apply only to
cases involving harassment by supervisors (Volk), or also to coworker cases. The court in Rabidue
limited the holding to cases involving harassment by coworkers. 805 F.2d at 621 n.6. Neither court
offered guidance as to under what circumstances an employer "should have known" that harassment
had taken place.
45 See supra note 24.
46 See, e.g., Meyers v. I.T.T. Diversified Credit Corp., 527 F. Supp. 1064, 1067 (E.D. Mo. 1981)
(The plaintiff was subjected to several sexual overtures by her supervisor, leading the plaintiff to
request a transfer to another location. The court noted that the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant was very strained.).
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discrimination in the workplace 47-has been frustrated in this area. Em-
ployers are not likely to take steps to provide a harassment-free environ-
ment unless faced with the possibility of liability at law for damages.
Equitable remedies alone will not make the sexual harassment victim
whole.
III. State Tort Law
Prior to the passage of Title VII, and subsequent acceptance by the
courts of a claim under Title VII for sexual harassment,48 the main relief
available to the plaintiff was under principles of common law tort.
49
Generally the victim of sexual harassment can sue for assault,
50 battery,51
intentional infliction of emotional distress,5 2 tortious interference with
contractual relationships,53 or invasion of privacy.5 4 A federal court can
exercise pendent jurisdiction in order to adjudicate the state law claim
brought in conjunction with a Title VII claim.55
Tort recovery focuses on remedying injury to a personal interest,
whether physical or emotional.5 6 Tide VII focuses on eliminating dis-
crimination in employment.57 This difference in emphasis and the possi-
bility of both compensatory and punitive damages58 make tort recovery
more well-suited in theory to compensating the victim of sexual harass-
ment for the injury actually suffered. 59
However, the context in which most sexual harassment cases arise
shows the inadequacy of the tort action. Battery claims require contact
with the plaintiff.60 Assault requires the plaintiff's imminent apprehen-
sion of harmful or offensive contact. 61 These theories are useful where
47 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971), the Court stated that the purpose of
Title VII "was to achieve equality of employment opportunities ......
48 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
49 The plaintiff could also sue for breach of contract in certain circumstances. See Note, Title VII:
Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 53 WASH. L. REV. 123, 136 n.62 (1977). This note will not
discuss the plaintiff's remedy in contract.
50 See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
51 See id.
52 See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
54 See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
55 In order to invoke pendent jurisdiction, the plaintiff must plead a substantial federal question,
and the federal and state claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
56 "Individuals wish to be secure in their persons against harm and interference, not only as to
their physical integrity, but as to their freedom to move about and their peace of mind." W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 16 (5th ed. 1984).
57 See supra note 47.
58 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 56, at 9-16.
59 See, e.g., Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
60 A battery occurs when the actor:
(a) acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a
third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965).
61 An actor commits an assault if:
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other
or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965).
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the plaintiff has experienced or anticipated some physical contact.6 2 If
the employer or coworker assaults the plaintiff verbally, or the plaintiff
does not fear immediate physical contact, she cannot recover for either
battery or assault.
In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant, by his extreme and outra-
geous conduct, caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress. 63 The
problem with recovery for this tort is in determining what constitutes
outrageous behavior.64 If recovery depends upon the attitude in a partic-
ular jurisdiction as to what behavior is outrageous, a victim will not re-
cover where the factfinder determines that sexual harassment is not
outrageous conduct.
65
A claim of interference with contractual relations, the contract being
between the plaintiff and her employer, only protects the plaintiff against
the activity of a third party.66 Thus, the plaintiff cannot recover against
the employer directly, but is limited to recovery against a third party,
such as a coworker, who has interfered with her relationship with her
employer. 67 Such a cause of action is ineffective where recovery against
the employer is imperative because he is in a position to encourage or
tolerate sexual harassment.
Finally, the plaintiff in an invasion of privacy action must have an
expectation of privacy or no tort has occurred.68 A court might hold that
the plaintiff only has an expectation of privacy as to her physical environ-
62 In Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981), the plaintiff, an
assistant manager of a restaurant, overcame a motion to dismiss assault and battery claims. She
alleged that the defendant, her manager, committed an assault by placing notes to her inside menus
which she gave to customers, causing her to fear harmful contact with the defendant. She also stated
a claim for battery based on defendant's repeatedly touching her body and pulling her hair.
63 "[O]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to
the other results from it, for such bodily harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
64 One commentator has argued that it is the economically coercive nature of sexual harassment
in the workplace which makes this behavior outrageous. See Note, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexal
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1482 (1986).
65 In Hooten v. Pennsylvania College of Optometry, 601 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1984), the
plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was based on belittling remarks made
by her employer about her marital status and role as a mother. An extremely heavy work schedule
forced her to commit errors. Due to these pressures, the plaintiff collapsed at work. Her supervisors
ignored her, and refused to come to her assistance. Surprisingly, these facts were not sufficient to
sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that, "while creating
an environment which is oppressive to function within is likely to cause distress it is not the type of
action to arouse resentment, by the average member of the community, against the actor." Id. at
1155.
66 One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract...
between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not
to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to
the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
67 See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.NJ. 1978). The plaintiff alleged a
pattern of conduct on the part of her coworkers and supervisors, including jointly agreeing to ridi-
cule and harass her as a woman, which interfered with her contractual relationship with her em-
ployer, Western Electric. Id. at 950.
68 "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,




ment.69 As a result, invasions of one's emotional privacy-constant de-
mands for sex or sexual teasing-might not be recognized as injuries.
The basic inadequacies of tort recovery are accentuated by the fact
that, in most cases, intentional tort plaintiffs cannot recover against the
employer for torts committed by an employee-the victim's coworker.
The employer will be held vicariously liable for the acts of the employee
only if the employee was acting within the scope of his employment when
he committed the tort.70 The verbal and physical sexual advances which
constitute sexual harassment rarely fall within the scope of employment.
As a result, the tort plaintiff cannot recover against the employer unless
the employer himself has committed the tort.7'
Tort law seems to fill one gap left by Tide VII-the plaintiff can re-
cover compensatory and punitive damages for harm to her personal, as
opposed to employment, interests. However, the plaintiff in a sexual
harassment suit could have problems pleading a prima facie case in sev-
eral tort claims.7 2 The plaintiff might also be limited to recovery against
the employee who committed the tort.7 3 Consequently, recovery in tort
presents as many problems as it solves for the victim of sexual
harassment.
IV. Equal Protection
The public sector employee has an additional remedy not available
to other employees: courts have recognized that sexual harassment vio-
lates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 4 Be-
cause sexual harassment constitutes illegal sex discrimination, the
plaintiff can bring an action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section
1983.7- Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals became the first
federal appellate court to acknowledge a constitutional claim for sexual
harassment.7 6
At the core of any equal protection action is the claim that the plain-
tiff is being treated differently from others similarly situated. The female
sexual harassment plaintiff is subjected to an oppressive work environ-
ment which her male counterparts are not forced to endure.7 7
69 See, e.g., Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 884 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
70 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the scope of employment includes "those acts
which are so closely concerned with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably
incidental to it, that they may be regarded as a method.., of carrying out the objectives ...... W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 56, at 502.
71 See Note, supra note 49, at 136-37 n.62.
72 See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
74 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
75 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
76 Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986). In Bohen, the plaintiff was a
dispatcher with the fire department. Her coworkers and supervisor subjected her to repeated acts of
sexual harassment. On her first night of work, the plaintiff awoke to find her supervisor's hands
pressed against her crotch. He constantly spoke to her in a lewd way, describing intimate sexual
matters. He even forced her to leave the door open when using the bathroom. Her coworkers also
subjected her to endless lewd conversation. Id. at 1183.
77 Finding an equal protection violation, the Bohen court asserted: "Forcing women and not
men to work in an environment of sexual harassment is no different than forcing women to work in a
dirtier or more hazardous environment than men simply because they were women." Id. at 1185.
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NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The plaintiff must prove that the discrimination was intentional. 78 A
single discriminatory act is sufficient to show intentional discrimina-
tion.79 However, in the sexual harassment context, it is questionable
whether one sexual encounter could ever constitute a denial of equal
protection. 0 A plaintiff can also show the requisite intent by proving
that the employer knew of the harassment caused by the employees and
failed to protect the plaintiff.8 '
Courts apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to official action which
classifies by gender in order to determine whether such classification is
justified, and therefore, not a constitutional violation. The question is
whether the classification serves important governmental objectives and
is substantially related to achievement of those objectives.8 2 Although
this standard does not rise to the level of strict scrutiny, courts should be
unwilling to find sexual harassment justifiable under any test.8 3 Classifi-
cation by gender may be justifiable; harassment is not.
The employer has a valid defense if he can show that the discrimina-
tion is based on characteristics peculiar to the plaintiff, and not because
of her membership in a particular class.8 4 Therefore, the definition of
the class being discriminated against is crucial.8 5 If the plaintiff cannot
show discrimination because of membership in this class, the cause of
action is not cognizable under section 1983.
The equal protection plaintiff can bring suit against a limited class of
defendants. Section 1983 liability requires that the deprivation of the
federal right occur under color of state law.8 6 Private individuals can act
under color of state law under certain circumstances and thus may be
liable under section 1983.87 A municipality may be liable under section
1983, but a municipality cannot be vicariously liable for the acts of its
officers unless the plaintiff's injury occurs as a result of an established
policy or law of the municipality.
88
78 Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719-21 (1986).
79 Id. at 1722.
80 The Bohen court attempted to define the scope of the equal protection right, stating: "[A]
single, innocent, romantic solicitation which inadvertently causes offense to its recipient is not a
denial of equal protection." 799 F.2d at 1186. The court gave several examples as to what might
constitute a violation of equal protection. Each included "repeated" sexual advances, indicating
that more than one encounter is needed before a court will find an equal protection violation. Id.
81 Id. at 1187.
82 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
83 "The nature of the harm is such that there is virtually no scenario imaginable where sexual
harassment is a necessary business practice or is substantially related to important governmental
objectives." Bolen, 799 F.2d at 1187.
84 Id.
85 In Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983), the
court found that the plaintiff was discriminated against because of past romantic involvement with
the defendant. "Thus, the proper classification, if there was one at all, was the group of persons with
whom the supervisor had or sought to have a romantic affair." Id. at 1172.
86 See supra note 9 accompanying text.
87 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
88 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978). The Court held that
municipalities could not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 solely on the basis of an em-
ployer/employee relationship. Liability is imposed only when "under color of some official policy,
[the government] 'causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional rights." Id. at 692.
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While the pool of defendants is limited, the scope of liability, once
established, can be extensive. The plaintiff in a section 1983 action may
recover both compensatory and punitive damages under section 1983.89
Because the purpose of section 1983 is to compensate persons for inju-
ries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, the rules of com-
mon law damages apply and the plaintiff is entitled to full compensation
for his injury.90
Section 1983 thus provides the most favorable recovery for the pub-
lic employee in a sexual harassment case. The elements are easier to
prove than the elements of most tort actions.91 Further, the possibility of
recovering compensatory and punitive damages makes a section 1983 ac-
tion more desirable than a Title VII claim, which affords only limited
remedies. 92 Unfortunately, the set of potential plaintiffs and defendants
is restricted by the requirement that a defendant must act under color of
state law and deprive the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right.93
V. Conclusion
For a sexual harassment plaintiff, none of the available means of re-
lief provides adequate recovery for the harm suffered. The purpose of
Title VII is to remove discrimination from the workplace, 94 yet damages
are severely limited. In contrast, traditional tort law compensates the
plaintiff for any actual injury suffered. Because of the unique factual set-
ting of a sexual harassment action, however, the elements of a tort action
for harassment are difficult to prove.95 Finally, while an equal protection
action has no such drawback as to remedies or proof of elements, only
plaintiffs injured by an individual acting under color of state law can as-
sert this claim.
The judiciary alone cannot remedy the problem of sexual harass-
ment based on existing law. The problem of distinguishing mutual male-
female interaction from sexual harassment 96 has confused the courts. In
the case of the public employer, the states must recognize the problem
and outline clear policy outlawing sexual harassment, in order to prevent
such behavior. The first goal of any state policy should be to teach em-
ployees that sexual harassment in the workplace will not be tolerated.
The state should notify all employees, subordinate employees as well as
supervisors, that it intends to eradicate this discrimination.
Susan M. Faccenda
89 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
90 Id. at 256-58.
91 See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
94 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
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